Mid-term transport report card

Two years since the last state election and two years until the next one, it’s time to evaluate how the O’Farrell government has performed on the issue of transport. Given the scale of time it takes to implement changes and additions to such a large system (a new rail line take almost a decade from inception to opening), it would not be fair to judge the government on things it has not yet had a chance to reform. At the same time, 2 years is enough to take advantage of low hanging fruit, make operational improvements, and begin the process of changing the direction of the heavy ship that is Sydney’s transport system.

This is a long post, so here is the summarised version:

• The good: The government has committed to a Second Harbour Crossing, Gladys Berejikliian is a good Transport Minister, the rollout of integrated ticketing (Opal) is on track, there will be a big increase in train services later this year, the South West Rail Link is running 6 months ahead of schedule, the creation of an integrated transport authority (Transport for NSW) will allow an integrated transport network, the government has prioritised public transport ahead of roads, the government learned from the PPP mistakes of the past, and new transport apps are making getting around easier.
• The bad: Overcrowding on Cityrail is up, on time running on Cityrail is down, no congestion charging, and no committment to a second Sydney airport.
• The uncertain: Integrated fares, sectorisation of the rail network to untangle it, and driverless trains??

The most important parts at this point in time, in my opinion, are a Second Harbour Crossing (good), integrated fares (uncertain), sectorisation (uncertain), creation of Transport for NSW (good), Opal (good), overcrowding (bad), on time running (bad), Transport Minister (good). our good, two uncertain, two bad. The two bad points could be improved with the October 2013 timetable changes, if some hard decisions are made, whereas the two uncertain points will require a decision some time this year. It will be worth revisiting this in 12 months time to see if the government delivers on those four points, but until then I would rate the government as a B overall (on a scale of A to F). This is giving them some benefit of the doubt, based on a good overall performance in other areas. Without the benefit of the doubt, bump that down to a C.

This is obviously quite subjective, so I welcome your thoughts and feedback in the comments section below.

Capacity improvements

The best way to improve capacity into dense employment centres, like the CBD, Parramatta, or Macquarie Park, is with rail, preferably heavy rail. It is pleasing to see, therefore, that the government has committed to a Second Harbour Crossing, a new light rail line down the CBD through to Randwick, and the North West Rail Link (NWRL), in addition to the South West Rail Link (SWRL) and Inner West Light Rail extension, both commenced under the previous government. The Second Harbour Crossing in particular, expensive and opposed by some as necessary given the cost, will result in a 33% increase in capacity across the network by adding a fourth path through the CBD.

The decision to dump the Parramatta to Epping Rail Link (PERL) is unfortunate, but was the right call as the priority right now is with the projects listed above. Similarly, the decision to build the NWRL with smaller and steeper tunnels, thus preventing existing double deck trains from using them, could be seen as short sighted. However, it also guarantees that the line will remain separate from the Cityrail network, opening up the possible benefits of a new operating model that has a lower cost to operate and therefore can provide more frequent services (see: Private sector involvement). It also has the benefit of lower construction costs, which would be very beneficial should the Second Harbour Crossing go under the Harbour, as seems likely.

• Conclusion: A committment to expand the rail network, a Second Harbour Crossing in particular, will improve capacity by 33%. The decision  to make the NWRL tunnels narrower and steeper remains controversial.
• Grade: B

Service quality

The Cityrail network, which forms the backbone of transport in Sydney, is under a lot of pressure at the moment. Overcrowing is up, while on time running is down. February was one of the worst months in Cityrail’s history, with 5 major disruptions during peak hour causing a suspension of services, which often spilled over onto other lines in the network. You have to go back 4 years to find operational figures this bad. It urgently needs additional train services to ease overcrowding and a more simplified network to improve reliability.

Interior of a Sydney tram. Overcrowding is up on the Cityrail network. Click on image for higher resolution. (Source: Author)

Part of the cause of these problems is the network that the government inherited. But 2 years in, it is now incumbent on the government to fix it. So far, this has meant 63 new services per week in 2011, and then 44 new services per week in 2012, for a total of 107 new services per week. This is a good start, but baby steps at best. What is really needed is an increase on the scale of the 2005 timetable, which cut 1,350 weekly services. Previously there have not been enough train drivers or rolling stock to do this, and it remains uncertain whether it’s possible now. Older, non-airconditioned trains may need to be used if the government does not order more Waratah trains to increase capacity.

Transport Minister Gladys Berejiklian has continually pointed to October of this year as the moment that a new timetable, re-written from the ground up, will be introduced that features a streamlined network with additional services. But few details have been officially released, though some proposed changes have been leaked. Once that is implemented, it would be worth revisiting this issue. Service is also still better than the horror years of 2003-05. These two factors give the government a slightly more favourable rating than would have otherwise been the case.

There have been some minor improvements that are worth mentioning in passing. Quiet carriages have been introduced and phone reception is now available in the CBD’s underground rail tunnels.

• Conclusion: Overcrowding and reliability are at 4 year lows in the rail network, though there have been minor improvements such as quiet carriages and phone reception. Overall, it’s a poor result.
• Grade: D

Ticketing and fares

The major issues here are the Opal rollout and integrated fares.

The implementation of Opal appears to be on track, with the new smartcard set to expand to the Manly Ferry on April 8, and then to the Eastern Suburbs and City Circle stations in the second half of 2013. Up to now it appears to have proceeded without any major hiccups, and has gotten further in the rollout than the T-Card did.

There remains little detail on integrated fares other than that cabinet will consider fares at some point in early 2013. This is a potential game changer, and it seems likely that it could be implemented once Opal is fully rolled out.

The government has made a committment to not increase fares beyond CPI unless service levels improve, and has also incorporated the light rail into myZone. Both are positive, though the former is problematic in that it will erode the ability of fares to recover operating costs, as fares only account for about a quarter of the cost to operate Sydney’s transport network.

• Conclusion: Good progress on Opal, but not on integrated fares. Limiting fare increases and putting the light rail on myZone are also some good minor improvements.
• Grade: C

Transport Minister

Gladys Berejiklian has been a good Transport Minister for 2 reasons: she supports public transport and she is a strong advocate of it.

She strikes the right balance between public transport (trains, buses, ferries, trams) and private transport (cars, roads). It’s worth pointing out that, despite numerous claims that this government is pro-car and anti-rail, the current government spends more than half of its transport capital works budget on public transport. It’s also worth remembering that private motor vehicle trips will continue to play a key role in providing mobility to Sydney residents, and therefore the road network should still be expanded. But the focus should be on public transport, as it currently is.

@nicklaus_mahony @tonyabbottmhr we've a balanced transport investment program - more than half of our allocated funds for public transport

— Barry O'Farrell (@barryofarrell) January 29, 2013

As an aside, this support for public transport is unusual for a politician from the conservative side of politics. But both Ms Berejiklian and the Premier Barry O’Farrell are not your traditional hard conservatives, both more accurately described as moderate pragmatists. They both seem to recognise that congestion is costing the NSW economy money and the best way to improve the situation is to focus on public transport.

The Victorian Liberal Government’s top transport project is a road tunnel under the CBD, while the recently elected WA Liberal Government rejected the opposition’s 75km expansion of the rail network in favour of a short airport rail link and light rail for the inner city with a greater focus on improving the road network. Across the Tasman, the Auckland Transport Blog speaks favourably of conservatives in Australia (though really it’s more a comment on NSW, because as seen this is not a view necessarily shared by Liberal Parties in other states):

“I guess this is what happens when you have a centre-right government that isn’t completely insane in its ideological dislike of public transport…I do wonder why centre-right politicians in Australia don’t seem to have the same ideological dislike of public transport as seems to be the case in New Zealand.” – Mr Anderson, Auckland Transport Blog (23 December 2012)

The other, and arguably more important, reason why Ms Berejiklian is a good Transport Minister is her strong advocacy. It’s not enough to support something if the cabinet or Premier overrule you. And Ms Berejiklian has demonstrated an ability to get her agenda through the cabinet where it’s been needed. She got cabinet to support an expensive Second Harbour Crossing, despite opposition from Infrastructure NSW Chairman Nick Greiner and took the light rail issue to cabinet 3 times until it accepted her preferred option of George St light rail over the CBD bus tunnel. These two major items, along with numerous other minor ones, were not a fait accompli, and are a testament to Ms Berejiklian’s influence.

• Conclusion: Gladys Berejiklian is supporter of and effective advocate for public transport
• Grade: A

Funding, costs and scheduling

Public transport projects in NSW seem to come in over budget and behind schedule all too often. That appears to have been partly continued. The Inner West Light Rail extension has been delayed by 18 months and its cost blown out by $56m, while the cost of the South West Rail Link (SWRL) went from $688m to $2.1bn. However, the SWRL is running ahead of schedule: the new Glenfield Station was completed 4 months ahead of schedule, while the new line is on track to open 6 months early. While this project was started by the previous Labor government, it’s delivery has been overseen by the current Liberal government and that’s what matters. The North West Rail Link has seen some blow outs in costs, but these are tens of millions of dollars in a multi-billion dollar project, so here it’s too early to make any judgement.

On the revenue side, the government has spoken about value capture as a way of funding infrastructure improvement, where property owners whose land values increase because of government built infrastructure contribute to the cost of building it. This is welcome, but no action has yet been taken. It has also openly committed to making users of any new or improved freeways pay tolls to contribute to their construction. This move to a user pays system, where the users of motorways pay for them rather than all taxpayers whether they use them or not, is a welcome one. What is unfortunate, is that the government has refused to introduce congestion charging, as pricing roadspace would allow a more efficient use of it, reducing congestion and the need to build more roads.

• Conclusion: Cost blowouts and delays remain, though a possible early finish to the SWRL is a welcome surprise. Tolling and funding is a mixed bag, but mostly positive.
• Grade: C

Governance

The two big reforms made by the government in the area of governance are the creation of Transport for NSW, which brought all transport related departments and agencies under the one umbrella, and the splitting of Railcorp into Sydney Trains and NSW Trains.

Transport for NSW’s creation is a game changer. By centralising planning into one department, rather than independent “silos” in separate departments that rarely communicate with each other, it will allow transport in Sydney to be fully integrated as one network, rather than a collection of separate networks. This extends to things like timetables and fares, but also adds roads to the mix – changing a transit department into a true transport department. All of this which will allow commuters to get from A to B much more easily than is currently the case. It will make examples like the following a thing of the past:

“For example, a customer could travel from St Ives to Sydney, via a private bus to Turramurra, a Cityrail train and walking along the city streets… The journey requires 2 separate tickets and therefore revenue streams, which never meet. The two vehicles are owned, maintained and driven by vastly different staff working for different silos.

The station facility is provided by Cityrail. If they’ve thought to accommdate the bus in the design of the facility, it would be the exception rather than the norm. The timetabling, if it is done at all, would be by a third silo in a distant building, remote from the reality of what’s happening.” – Riccardo, Integrated transport planning – what is it really? (11 June, 2011)

The Transport Master Plan put a great deal of emphasis on moving towards an integrated network, one where it would be much more common practice to take a feeder bus to a transport interchange and then take train, tram, or another bus to your final destination, with all coming frequently and all day, in order to maximise mobility. This would be a big improvement on the current network design, which is designed more around a single seat trip to the CBD than on connections to get you from anywhere to everywhere. However, this will be difficult to implement without integrated fares (discussed above), as currently commuters are penalised for making a transfer as though it is a premium service, when really it’s an inconvenience.

Evidence of the benefits of centralised planning can be seen in the recent decision to house metrobuses in separate depots in order to minimise dead running. This was not previously possible, as planning was done at the depot level, and so shifting buses from one depot to another was not feasible.

A Metrobus on George St in the Sydney CBD. Click on image for higher resolution. (Source: Author)

The changes to Railcorp are not set to occur until July 1 of this year, so the jury is still out on that.

• Conclusion: The creation of Transport for NSW, centralising the planning function and creating a true transport department.
• Grade: A

Planning

NSW has had no lack of plans in recent years, if anything it’s had the problem of too many plans but not enough action. When it comes to just planning, the government had 2 competing visions: the Transport Master Plan from Transport for NSW and the State Infrastructure Strategy from Infrastructure NSW.

To its credit, every time the two plans disagreed, the state government sided with the Transport Master Plan every time. That means it has committed to building a Second Harbour Crossing for the rail network and light rail down George Street rather than the ill-fated bus tunnel idea.

It also dogmatically refused to commit to a light rail line to Randwick until a feasibility study was completed, but then got totally behind the project once it was completed and put before cabinet.

That is not to say that there aren’t concerns about the planning process. For example, the government has committed to the Second Harbour Crossing before having done enough work into it to name a cost or set a timetable for its completion. It was this sort of behaviour that contributed to the $500m spent on the aborted Rozelle Metro by the previous government.

• Conclusion: The government has sided with Transport for NSW, rather than Infrastructure NSW, leading to a greater focus on public transport, rather than private transport. However, it has a mixed history of committing to projects before having done its homework.
• Grade: B

Private sector involvement

The failure of PPPs like the Airport Line as well as the Cross City and Lane Cove Tunnels mean that government’s should approach private sector involvement with caution. But that does not mean that it should avoid it entirely.

In NSW, the government has opted to adopt the WA model, rather than the Victorian model. In WA, the government plans and owns the network, but puts the operation of various lines or regions out to tender, allowing competitive practice to drive down costs while maintaining a minimum contractual level of service. The government then pays the operator, but keeps all fares, ensuring that the operator can increase profits only by operating more efficiently, rather than by cutting service. The Victorian model sees the operators keep farebox revenue, which is then topped up by a government subsidy. The disadvantage of the Victorian model is that the operator can increase profits by cutting services with low patronage, even if these services are part of an overall network such as feeder buses.

The chosen model has proven successful in NSW, having been used on the bus network for almost a decade. It allowed the government to put some bus contracts out to tender, resulting in $18m of annual savings for the tax payer. It has also recently been expanded, when Sydney Ferries being franchised last year. The NWRL is also planned to be privately operated, while the Sydney light rail line was recently re-purchased by the government but will remain operated by a private company.

Sydney Ferries were franchised in 2012. (Source: Author)

The decision to turn the NWRL into a completely separate and privately operated line, but one where commuters still pay the same fare as if they were on a Cityrail train, has the potential to finally stem the bleeding in Cityrail’s costs, perhaps through the use of driverless trains that would allow very high all day frequencies.

The recently introduced unsolicited proposal process has also allowed a proposal for an M2-F3 link to be constructed by the private sector at no cost to the taxpayer. While the outcome is uncertain, the process has been shown to work, and is a great way to increase the stock of infrastructure in Sydney. (Setting aside the involvement of this process for another Sydney Casino, which has raised some controversy.)

• Conclusion: The government has learned from the bad PPPs of the past and appears to be using private sector involvement as a means, rather than as an ends.
• Grade: A

Second Sydney airport

The current government has not only ruled out the preferred site of Badgerys Creek for a second airport, it has ruled out a second airport altogether, suggesting that a high speed rail line to Canberra airport could be used as a substitute. Not only is this unlikely to happen, given the high costs involved, but it means passing up on the opportunity to bring jobs to Western Sydney and revitalise its economy, which currently has a huge jobs shortfall that is only predicted to increase.

Current and proposed Sydney airports. Click on image for higher resolution. (Source: Google Maps)

Given the lack of support for a second airport, it is then disappointing that the government has not sought to reduce or elimiate the access fee for users of the airport train stations in order to ease the ground transport congestion around the airport, cited as the biggest constraint on Sydney’s Kingsford-Smith Airport at the moment.

• Conclusion: The government does not support a second airport, and has not done enough to improve the capacity of the existing airport.
• Grade: F

Transport apps

The makers of transport apps have seen an increase in the amount of transport data available to them. This has allowed for Google Transit to expand to all forms of public transport (previously it was just light rail and the monorail), and has also now included bike paths (though it seems Google did this on its own, rather than with help from the state government). More recently real time bus data was provided for STA buses, and will hopefully later be extended to all buses and also trains.

• Conclusion: The government has been proactive in improving transport information to commuters by involving third party developers.
• Grade: A

Commentary: Are the NWRL tunnels too narrow and too steep?

The recent article by Sandy Thomas made numerous criticisms of the current government’s policy choice on heavy rail in Sydney, but ended by making a plea with the government to build the North West Rail Link’s tunnels at a width and gradient sufficient to allow Cityrail’s existing double deck trains to pass through it. Not doing so, Mr Thomas argues, would be akin to repeating the mistake of 1855 where different rail gauges were set for different states, forever preventing any movement of trains from one network to another. While his other arguments went so far as being wishful thinking or even approaching conspiracy theories, this is the one point which has garnered the most public support and is the most likely element that the government would change, if it changes anything at all.

The Northwest Rail Link will include a new railway from Epping to Rouse Hill, plus a retrofitted Epping to Chatswood Line. Click on image for higher resolution. (Source: NWRL EIS – Introduction, page 1-3.)

I am still undecided as to what I think about this move. It does concern me that this will create 2 separate systems, one of which will eventually go as far as Hurstville, Cabramatta, Lidcombe, and Rouse Hill, running exclusively single deck trains. Will these corridors, or even part of these corridors still be using single deck rolling stock 50 or 100 years from now? The simple answer is we just don’t know, so the safe thing to do it to build them with the ability to convert them in future, just as part of the current network is being converted now.

This plan appears even more absurd when you realise that the savings from the NWRL tunnels will be offset by the cost of converting the line between Epping and Chatswood for single deck trains. In other words, it will cost more than creating a new line with just double deck trains.

Countering these are 2 points in favour that are worth considering. First is that if a Second Harbour Crossing is built under the Harbour, then narrower and steeper tunnels will result in much more significant cost savings than they would on just the NWRL portion. Second, there is nothing to say that double deck trains in the future could be small enough and powerful enough to fit into the narrower tunnels and make it through the steeper gradients. In fact, a cynic could argue that since the tunnels are only barely small enough to prevent existing rolling stock from fitting though them, that this was purposely done to prevent only current rolling stock from using it, rather than any potential future rolling stock. It also deserves remembering that the Epping to Chatswood Line’s tunnels were built too steep for some Cityrail trains. So this is not necessarily as much of a long term line in the sand that the different rail gauges of 1855 were (something which can never really be overcome).

At the heart of all of this is whether an independent single deck metro is the best way to run the NWRL. I think it is, on both cases. An independent line will allow the government to escape the bottomless money pit that Railcorp has turned into, perhaps even result in driverless trains that can achieve very high all day frequencies while allowing the cost savings to be directed at better staffing at stations or more roving security guards/police rather than drivers and train guards (responsible for telling you to stand clear of the doors rather than any tangible security) which are redundant given today’s modern technology. A single deck metro is also appropriate for the global economic corridor that the NWRL will cover and its high turnover passenger nature, preventing dwell times from ballooning out and thus maintaining a high level of on time running.

Making the tunnels narrow and steep guarantees that the NWRL will end up as an independent metro line. It prevents any future government from having second thoughts on the matter. So clearly, if you disagree with how the NWRL should operate, as Mr Thomas does, then the tunnel’s decision is the biggest point of focus for you. Therefore, to justify the tunnels as planned, you need to have no doubt in your mind that this is the best option to take.

And this is why I’m still undecided. I have little doubt that an independent, single deck metro line is the best way forward on the NWRL, but that is not a complete absence of doubt. So while I remain open to the decision to build narrower and steeper tunnels, I am hesitant to endorse it. But I do find myself currently leaning towards it.

Why is Cityrail getting less reliable?

Reliability on the Cityrail network, as measured by on time running, last year reached its worst point since 2008. The state opposition has criticised the current government’s failure to get the trains to run on time, this being one area that has deteriorated since the change of government from Labor to Liberal.

This was then followed by a large number of disruptions to the network in February 2013, which also reduced reliability on the network.

[tweet 307369371121106944 align=’center’]

But these disruptions happened after reliability began to fall, so are not the cause of it. Instead, the reduction in reliability is more likely to have been caused by increased overcrowding issues, which have also deteriorated since the O’Farrell government took over in 2011.

This is because overcrowding on trains means it takes longer for commuters to get on or off their train, which can increase dwell times at stations and thus lead to delays on the network. A quick look at the overcrowding (Source: IPART, Review of fares for CityRail’s services from January 2013, page 91) and on time running (Source: Cityrail, Our Performance) data for the 5 years from July 2007 to June 2012 shows a clear relationship.

Overcrowding, measured twice yearly in March and September as the percentage of trains between 7AM and 10AM with over 135% as many passengers as there are seats, hit 13%-16% during 2007-08, before falling progressively from 2009 onwards until it reached 5% in late 2011. Then in March 2012 it rose again to 11%, the highest since 2008.

On time running, measured monthly as the proportion of trains arriving in the CBD between 6AM-9AM and departing the CBD between 4PM-6PM more than 5 minutes after the timetabled time, is almost the inverse of overcrowding. On time running was low during 2007-08, usually running at 92%-95%. Following this, on time running improved, generally ranging between 94%-97%, during 2009-11. Then in 2012 it once again dropped to 92%.

Click on image for higher resolution. (Sources: IPART, Cityrail.)

The overcrowding is itself caused by a failure to keep up with demand for rail travel. The monthly patronage data (Source: Bureau of Transport Statistics, Rail Patronage Data – July 2000 to September 2012) shows that patronage saw a constant growth during 2007-08 and 2011-12, but flat lined during 2009-10. This in turn was likely due to job losses associated with the Global Financial Crisis, which hit industries that tend to employ workers in the CBD, which is the primary destination for most train users in Sydney.

Click on image for higher resolution. (Source: Bureau of Transport Statistics.)

Therefore, had it not been for the GFC, the poor on time running of 2012 would likely have occurred earlier. How much earlier is open to debate, as the opening of the Epping to Chatswood Line in 2009 resulted in an increase in capacity that would have pushed back the moment that overcrowding would again become a problem.

However, this does not represent a get out of jail free card for the government. Though it had no control over the transport system it inherited, it does have full control over where it takes it. Therefore, it needs to find a way to increase capacity in order to reduce overcrowding and improve on time running. Building more rail lines are needed for this, but will take years or decades to build. In the short term, sectorisation is the only option available to the government that will result in a significant increase to capacity. It should further implement this as part of the 2013 timetable.

Government releases plan to house and employ 5.6 million Sydneysiders

Sydney is growing faster than expected, with today’s Draft Metropolitan Strategy revising Sydney’s projected population in 2031 to 5.6m people. This is an increase of 1.3m people on today’s population of 4.3m, and has been caused in part by a greater volume of migration to Australia during the Global Financial Crisis. It also extends the Global Economic Corridor, previously going from Port Botany to Macquarie Park via Sydney Airport, Sydney CBD, North Sydney, St Leonards, and Chatswood, through to both Parramatta and Norwest Business Park as well as to Bondi Junction and the Randwick Education & Health Precinct.

The Global Economic Corridor will now extend to Parramatta and Norwest Business Park. Click on image for higher resolution. (Source: Department of Planning, Draft Metropolitan Strategy, 2013, page 82.)

It further sets a target of 545,000 new dwellings and 625,000 new jobs by 2031, an increase of around 30% on the current 1.7m dwellings and 2.2m jobs. These targets are themselves 17% and 33% higher respectively than those set in the previous 2011 Metropolitan Strategy. This is the equivalent of an additional 27,500 dwellings per year, almost twice the 14,500 that have actually been built per year in Sydney recently, and would lessen the upward pressure on house prices that has recently led to a deterioration in housing affordability.

The Strategy points out that there are 30,000 Ha of undeveloped land in Sydney’s Metropolitan Urban Area (representing about 15% of Sydney’s urban land), which would be enough to build over 200,000 additional dwellings, or about a third of the 545,000 dwellings required by 2031. The bulk of this already appears to have been allocated to the South West Growth Centre (110,000 dwellings) and North West Growth Centre (70,000 dwellings). The remaining land in metropolitan Sydney, known as the Metropolitan Rural Area, will be protected for biodiversity and to maintain environmental assets.

The government simultaneously announced a plan for an additional 172,000 dwellings in Sydney, to be built between 2014 and 2036. However, only 112,000 dwellings will actually be ready for development at this point, with 60,000 merely set aside for investigation. This will be achieved via a mix of land releases in greenfield sites on the urban fringe concentrated around the North West & South West Growth Centres, and from infill developments concentrated around the soon to be built North West Rail Link (NWRL) and South East Light Rail Line.

Location of new greenfield and infill housing developments. Click on image for higher resolution. (Source: Department of Planning, Homes and Jobs for Sydney’s Growth, 2013, page 5.)

All up, the infill developments – NWRL (27,400 dwellings) and Urban Activation Precincts (30,000 dwellings), represent 51% of new dwellings, while the greenfield developments – North West & South West Growth Centres (38,450 dwellings) and landowner nominated sites (15,850 dwellings), represent 49% of new dwellings. This is down from the 70% infill target of the previous Labor Government, and in line with Barry O’Farrell’s promise to bring the ratio down from 70/30 to 50/50. However, given that only one third of the 2031 housing target can be met with greenfield developments, it remains uncertain how the government can sustain this ratio without creeping into the Metropolitan Rural Area.

The Strategy is now open to public consultation, submissions can be made until 31 May 2013.

Improving transport in Western Sydney

One criticism sometimes raised on the O’Farrell government’s transport policies are that all new transport projects are CBD centric. The Northwest Rail Link (NWRL) and Southwest Rail Link (SWRL) will both funnel commuters into the CBD, as will the Southeast and Inner West Light Rail Lines aswell as the Northern Beaches BRT. But what about Western Sydney? The previous Labor government, for all its shortcomings, did build the Y-Link at Harris Park that enabled the Cumberland Line and also constructed the Northwest and Southwest T-Ways, all of which were Parramatta centric rather than CBD centric.

These comments are almost always followed up by calls for the construction of some new transport line in Western Sydney, be it re-routing the NWRL via Parramatta, building the Parramatta to Epping Rail Link, or the creation of a Western Sydney Light Rail network. If resources were unlimited, then construction on all of these would begin tomorrow. But they are not, so it poses the question: given the limited transport budget, what would provide the largest benefit to Western Sydney for the smallest cost?

Current transport infrastructure in Western Sydney that is currently underutilised: the Cumberland Line in red and the bus T-Ways in blue, as well as the proposed Parramatta to Epping Rail Link in purple. Click on image for higher resolution. (Source: Open Street Map.)

A counter-argument to this is that rather than suffering from underinvestment, Western Sydney instead suffers from poor planning. So rather than building new infrastructure  the government should instead first seek to fully utilise existing infrastructure. The Cumberland Line, for example, runs only 5 trains per day. Yet because this line branches out at Granville, about half the trains go South to Liverpool and half go West to Blacktown, there is plenty of spare capacity on it. It would be quite easy to run 2 or even 4 trains an hour in each direction on this line all day. The T-Ways, while currently providing good service with 10-15 minute frequencies all day (and as many as 20 buses during the busiest hour in the AM and PM), could easily scale this up even further. A lack of layover space for buses in Parramatta’s CBD means buses may need to be through-routed past Parramatta and end their route elsewhere, but this would also have the added benefit of providing additional direct links to Parramatta.

The main reason why this does not happen is the political benefit from it is small compared to new construction. “Government to build new rail line to XYZ” makes a great headline, whereas “Government to provide additional frequencies on existing line with spare capacity” does not. Here the O’Farrell government should learn from the Carr Government’s Clearways Program, which sought to increase the capacity of the Cityrail network by targeting bottlenecks and pinch points in the existing network, rather than increasing capacity by building new lines. It did not get the sort of headlines that the NWRL, SWRL, or WestConnex have, but it achieved the sorts of benefits of these new projects at a fraction of the cost.

Subject to feasability

NOTE: I’m not an expert on Perth’s transport network, the extent of it isn’t much beyond the one time I caught a train in Perth back in the mid 90s. So apologies if there are any inadvertent errors about the network or specific policies by either government (the ABC’s 730 WA program did a more in depth report here, for those interested). It’s more the general concept that I’m trying to comment on than the specifics of Perth itself.

WA voters go to the polls this weekend to elect their state government, and one of the major issues is public transport. Perth in particular is suffering growing pains and the failure of infrastructure to keep up has resulted in big increases in congestion. In an attempt to re-gain power, WA’s opposition Labor Party has put together a heavy rail expansion policy known as Metronet: representing 75km of new rail lines out into the outer suburbs of Perth. The Liberal government, led by Premier Colin Barnett, is proposing a single new line to the airport, light rail from inner Perth into the CBD, and improvements to the road network.

Metronet. The WA Labor Party’s proposed rail expansion plan. Click on image for higher resolution. (Source: WA Labor Party.)

One of the lines promised by Labor’s Metronet is the Ellenbrook Line in Perth’s North (the green line in the top right of the map). The current Liberal government actually promised to build this line during the 2008 election that put them into power, but later reneged on this promise on the basis that no work had been done on it and that the PTA (WA’s public transport agency) did not consider it a priority. Labor Leader Mark McGowan was criticised for this during the leaders’ debate (video available here, skip ahead to the 30 minute mark). This was the content of the exchange:

Geof Parry (7 News): The PTA had a look at this and there’s not the case now for a rail line to Ellenbrook. I mean, that’s PTA, not the government, saying there’s no case for it.

Mark McGowan (WA Opposition Leader): Ellenbrook is growing massively and everyone out there knows it. My colleague Rita Saffioti tells me about it everyday. But this rail line will also connect Morley up to Ellenbrook. There will be 200,000 people living there and they need decent transport.

Mr McGowan has the right conceptual framework here. Nothing competes with heavy rail when it comes to passenger capacity, and building lots of it is the most effective way of relieving congestion. But Mr Barnett has the implementation right. He promised the Ellenbrook Line from opposition, but when in government the public service informed him that it was not a line that was needed, and so he abandoned it.

Without knowing much about the details of the Ellenbrook Line it’s impossible to say for sure, but the earlier quote does make it look more like a line on a map drawn for political purposes than the conclusion of a well thought out process of how to improve Perth’s transport network. In that regard, it is quite similar to the now abandoned Parramatta to Epping Rail Link (PERL) in NSW. Here you had a line which was supported for political reasons, rather than because it fit into a big picture plan (even Infrastructure Australia rejected the PERL as “not on Infrastructure Australia’s priority list”).

The reality is that going to an election with very specific plans for what you are going to build is not the right approach. It would be like the federal opposition in 2007 promising to not only build the NBN, but providing a detailed list of where it would be rolled out to over the next decade. Those sorts of details are better left to when you get into government, with a more general view until that point.

The O’Farrell government did this well regarding light rail in the lead up to the 2011 election. It used phrases like “could expand Sydney’s light rail” rather than “will expand”, and attached the words “subject to feasibility” to the end of most of its promises (Source: page 19, NSW Voting Guide 2011). Some may have criticised this as providing themselves with a get out of jail free card. But if the alternative is dogmatically following through on an election promise which the public service have shown them to be misguided, then some wriggle room is much preferred. (It should be noted that there is a fine line between outlining your ambitions, and pretending to endorse a transport project without actually committing to it.)

In fact, the current NSW government’s backflip on the NWRL – which it promised would run double deck trains through to the city – is further evidence of the importance not to promise down to the minor details when you don’t know what will or won’t work. Politicians of all parties and in all jurisdictions would do well to remember that, and learn to say the words “subject to feasibility”.

Is WestConnex worth building without a CBD link?

The Prime Minister Julia Gillard has offered $1bn in funding for Sydney’s WestConnex, based on it meeting 3 conditions. It must go all the way to the CBD, it must go all the way to Port Botany, and the government must not impose tolls on currently untolled roads. None of these are currently part of the WestConnex proposal. The Premier Barry O’Farrell immediately dismissed the offer, claiming that doing these three would cost $5bn to $9bn in additional construction and lost revenue.

Map of the proposed WestConnex route. Click on image for higher resolution. (Source: Open Street Map.)

It is the first point, on linking WestConnex through to the CBD, that has obtained the most attention, and here Mr O’Farrell has got it right. Many transport experts support the decision to not send WestConnex right into the CBD. It’s worth remembering that private vehicles on roads do a terrible job of moving large numbers of people to a single place: a single track of rail has ten times the capacity of a single lane of road. Congestion on the roads leading into the CBD cannot be solved by building more roads into the CBD, it won’t eliminate the bottleneck – it will merely shift it closer to the CBD. Not only is CBD road space limited, but so are parking spaces, and both of these are a poor use of the very limited space available in the city centre.

The only way to improve capacity into the CBD is to improve public transport, and that means more investment in train, buses, and trams. Public transport (and to a lesser extent, active transport – walking and cycling) are effective to areas with a high employment density.

So if WestConnex will do a bad job of transporting people into the CBD, then why isn’t it being scrapped entirely? Answering that question needs a non-CBD centric perspective on jobs and commuting in Sydney. One of the experts opposing the CBD link, Dr Garry Glazebrook of UTS, points out that “the point about motorways is not to service the CBD. It’s cross-regional traffic”.

Location of jobs in Sydney. Click on image for higher resolution. (Source: Bureau of Transport Statistics, Employment and Commuting in Sydney’s Centres, 1996 – 2006, page 2.)

The Bureau of Transport Statistics compiled these figures from the 2006 census and released it in a document called Employment and Commuting in Sydney’s Centres, 1996 – 2006. These show that 1,923,900 were employed in 2006 in the Sydney statistical district, an area which includes the Central Coast. It then breaks these jobs down by location, into one of 33 activity centres and the remainder of Sydney, while excluding the 110,342 who’s employment location is listed as “unknown”. The largest centre is the CBD, with 230,049 jobs (12.7% of the total), with all other centres collectively employing 484,447 people (26.7% of the total). The remaining 1,099,062 work in the rest of Sydney or have “no fixed address” (60.6% of the total).

Sydney CBD has an employment density of 546 jobs/Ha, and hence a very high public and active transport share of of journeys to work of 76.6%, with only 19.5% of journeys primarily made by car (combination of driver and passenger).

Journey to work modal share for Sydney CBD. Click on image for higher resolution. (Source: Bureau of Transport Statistics, Employment and Commuting in Sydney’s Centres, 1996 – 2006, page 10.)

The 32 other centres are classified based on type, which include Central Sydney (e.g. Redfern), Commercial/Business Park (e.g. North Sydney), Education/Health (e.g. Westmead), Industrial (e.g. Port Botany), Regional (e.g. Liverpool), and retail (e.g. Castle Hill). These centres have a large range in employment density, from 1 job/Ha in Eastern Creek to 369 jobs/Ha in North Sydney. However, these are both outliers, and all other centres range from 11 jobs/Ha to 271 jobs/Ha. This lower employment density leads to a lower public and active transport share of 30.0%, with 69.1% of journeys primarily made by car.

Journey to work mode share for other centres in Sydney. Click on image for higher resolution. (Source: Bureau of Transport Statistics, Employment and Commuting in Sydney’s Centres, 1996 – 2006, page 10.)

That leaves the rest of Sydney, where 60.6% of people work. These are dispersed and have a very low employment density of 0.8 jobs/Ha. This is very difficult to service by public transport, so these parts of Sydney have a public and active transport share of only 14.0%, with 85.2%  of journeys primarily made by car.

Journey to work mode share for rest of Sydney. Click on image for higher resolution. (Source: Bureau of Transport Statistics, Employment and Commuting in Sydney’s Centres, 1996 – 2006, page 10.)

By not linking directly to the CBD, it is precisely these dispersed jobs that WestConnex is best equipped to serve. Critics of WestConnex who (rightly) point out that dumping more cars into the CBD will not solve Sydney’s congestion problem fail to acknowledge that this is a very CBD-centric view of roads planning. With over 60% of jobs outside of major centres, and 87% outside the CBD, roads have and will continue to play a role in providing the appropriate mobility to the people of Sydney.

It is in the CBD, and to a lesser extent the inner city and other major centres, that public transport should and must be the priority.

Rail expert says infighting led to decision to build metros

The transport bureaucracy underwent a war of ideas last decade between supporters of single deck and double deck trains, according to one of the author’s of the Sydney Morning Herald’s 2010 Independent Public Inquiry into a Long-Term Public Transport Plan for Sydney, Sandy Thomas, in a 13 page article called ‘Fixing’ the trains in Sydney: 1855 revisited. The metro advocates would come out victorious, according to Mr Thomas, and their advice has been accepted without question by Transport Ministers since, despite only representing one side of the debate. He further laments that this could lead to a repeat of the year 1855, when different rail gauges in different parts of Australia prevented a unified rail network, but this time with narrower and steeper tunnels preventing double deck trains from ever using big chunks of the current Cityrail network.

Mr Thomas outlines the history that led up to this point, starting with the Metropolitan Rail Expansion Program of 2005, which would see the construction of the North West Rail Link (NWRL), South West Rail Link (SWRL), and a Second Harbour Crossing, as well as track amplifications from Chatswood to St Leonards and Redfern to Campbelltown. Together with some existing lines, these would form an entirely new fast and frequent line in the network comprised of longer ten-carriage trains for long distance trips through to the North West and South West Growth Centres, operating independently from the rest of the network. It would increase CBD capacity by almost a third.

Once built, all future lines would also be entirely separate, running independently, most likely with single deck metro rolling stock.

The 2005 Metropolitan Rail Expansion Plan. Click on image for higher resolution. (Source: ‘Fixing’ the trains in Sydney: 1855 revisited.)

Critics of this plan included some within the Transport Department who saw Railcorp as inefficient, led on by the Rail, Tram, and Bus Union, as well as those who were motivated by what Mr Thomas describes as “playing with new train sets”. These critics found support in the NSW Treasury – from which many staff of Infrastructure NSW would be drawn from later on – who also wanted an independent line that could be operated privately instead of by Railcorp.

“the infighting, largely but not wholly hidden from public view, was by all accounts long and bitter. To this day many of the personalities involved scarcely talk to each other” – Sandy Thomas, ‘Fixing’ the trains in Sydney: 1855 revisited, page 3 (February 2013)

Together, these public servants convinced the politicians to dump the MREP and instead immediately build a new series of metro lines. Mr Thomas explains that this was done by the presenting of selective details of each plan, rather than painting the full picture, and that politicians with little to no background in transport planning accepted these half truths as fact.

“the reports of public servants and consultants whose findings turn out to be “inconvenient” can be and have been ruthlessly suppressed” – Sandy Thomas, ‘Fixing’ the trains in Sydney: 1855 revisited, page 13 (February 2013)

The first of these would be the North West Metro, which would take the existing NWRL and connect it to the CBD via Victoria Road, rather than the then still under construction Epping to Chatswood Line, in part to avoid an expensive Second Harbour Crossing. Mr Thomas points out that while this new line provided Victoria Road with a rail line, it bypassed the jobs rich corridor of Macquarie Park, Chatswood, St Leonards, and North Sydney.

This was planned to be only the first of a number of new metros, including metros to the Northern Beaches as well as under Parramatta Road and Anzac Parade. However, a lack of funds resulted in it being contracted to “CBD Metro”, going out as far as Rozelle, only to be abandoned altogether in 2009.

The 2007 Sydney Metros plan. Click on image for higher resolution. (Source: Wikipedia.)

The government returned to something broadly resembling the MREP: the NWRL and SWRL, but replacing the Second Harbour Crossing with a “Western Express”, which would allow fast trains from Sydney’s West to continue through to Wynyard via a “City Relief Line” under the CBD. A promise of funding from the federal government also added the Parramatta to Epping Rail Link (PERL) to that list of projects. A change of government in 2011 saw the incoming O’Farrell government keep and prioritise the NWRL and SWRL, while deferring and eventually dumping the Western Express and PERL.

Meanwhile, inside the Transport for NSW, a new plan was designed to convert part of the existing network to single deck metro trains, including the existing Harbour Crossing in an attempt to avoid building a Second Harbour Crossing. This plan was leaked to the media, and consisted of the NWRL and North Shore Line to the North as well as the Inner West Line, Bankstown Line, and part of the Illawarra Line through to Hurstville (utilising a second pair of tracks between Sydenham and Hurstville).

Mr Thomas explains that this plan was prevented from getting the green light because it would be unable to handle 28 to 30 trains per hour, as previously believed, and therefore not provide the additional cross Harbour capacity that it promised. It too, would be abandoned (though while still in the planning stages), and plans for a Second Harbour Crossing were once again put back on the table.

The 2011 leaked metro conversion plan. Click on image for higher resolution. (Source: ‘Fixing’ the trains in Sydney: 1855 revisited.)

Uncertainty remained. Mr Thomas points out that while Transport for NSW opposition to a new double deck line integrated into the Cityrail network was shared by Treasury, and now also Infrastructure NSW, that this did not extend to large scale expansion of the rail network. Instead these were “advocates of greater spending on motorways rather than public transport, including Infrastructure NSW supremos Nick Greiner and Paul Broad, [who] were actively ramping up their efforts to kill off any form of the North West Rail Link project” (Sandy Thomas, ‘Fixing’ the trains in Sydney: 1855 revisited, page 4).

As it were, Infrastructure NSW did endorse the NWRL, most likely due to pressure from the government, but opposed the construction of a Second Harbour Crossing, instead suggesting the government opt for the previously rejected metro conversion. Transport for NSW instead suggested a Second Harbour Crossing in addition to, rather than in lieu of, a metro conversion. The government sided with Transport for NSW.

The 2012 Sydney’s Rail Future plan. Click on image for higher resolution. (Source: ‘Fixing’ the trains in Sydney: 1855 revisited.)

This plan, known as Sydney’s Rail Future, included a modified version of the NWRL with narrower and steeper tunnels, too small to fit existing double deck trains and too steep for them to run through even if they did fit. It is here that Mr Thomas makes not so much his main criticism, but almost a plea to the Transport Minister. His concluding remarks are replicated below in full.

“But there’s one simple step that NSW Transport Minister Gladys Berejiklian can and should take immediately: veto the lunatic attempt by her bureaucrats to quietly create a multiple “loading gauge” rail network in Sydney through the specification of unnecessarily small and steep tunnels on the North West Rail Link.

If Ms Berejiklian does this, she’ll be rightly remembered as the politician who took less than a year to unravel the loomingmess ofmultiple gauges in Sydney. In comparison, that first “expert” multiple gauge decision in Sydney, in 1855, is still creating problems around the nation 158 years on.

If she does intervene in this way, even if realpolitiks forces her in the short term to persist with Sydney’s Rail Future’s cobbled together “vision” for second-best services on the North West Rail Link, in the longer term sanity can be restored and everyone wanting to keep open a real possibility of much-needed, cost-effective improvements in all of Sydney’s rail services, instead of the cannibalisation and quiet dismantling that is now proposed, will have cause to thank her forever.” – Sandy Thomas, ‘Fixing’ the trains in Sydney: 1855 revisited, page 13 (February 2013)

Fare free day?

Five major disruptions resulting in suspension of services occurred in Cityrail’s suburban network during the month of February, with a sixth in the first day of March. (See below for details of these disruptions.) Three of these suspensions lasted for a number of hours, requiring the deployment of rail replacement buses. This represents a serious deterioration on Cityrail’s regular performance.

Affected commuters were also given the option to use their tickets on other modes of transport in order to lighten the load. This is yet another reason to support integrated fares, which would allow this sort of approach to be the norm, rather than the exception.

[tweet 301621109231587328 align=’center’]

The state Opposition has responded by calling for a fare free day, which was subsequently rejected by the government.

The argument against a fare free day is that it takes money away from public transport that is needed to improve the system. In addition, most of the benefit will go towards higher income professionals who work in the CBD, people who can afford to contribute the 28% of the operating costs of Cityrail which their fares recover and so should not be subsidised further via a fare free day.

However, when an organisation provides poor customer service (regardless of who is at fault), it is quite common to provide the customer with some sort of token gesture of apology. Given the exceptional nature of the disruptions caused in February, a fare free day would go some way to dissipating the frustration of those affected and try to recover at least some of the goodwill that was lost in that month.

Origin of Cityrail disruptions since start of February. Click on image for higher resolution. (Source: Cityrail.)

1. Waverton

Cause: Tangled overhead wires

Date: 4 February 2013

Lines affected: All but Eastern Suburbs and Illawarra Lines

Duration: Trains suspended between 5:40AM until 11:13AM, delays continued until 3:17PM

Details: In what appears to be an error during the previous weekends’ trackworks on the North Shore Line, overhead wires were tangled near Waverton Station and discovered by a train driver passing through there in the early morning. Services were suspended, with delays spreading to all lines on the network other than the Eastern Suburbs and Illawarra Lines as they are operated separately from the rest of the network. The overhead wires were not fixed until the late morning, with trains back on schedule shortly before the evening peak.

2. Strathfield

Cause: Fire in signal box

Date: 13 February 2013

Lines affected: All but Eastern Suburbs and Illawarra Lines

Duration: Trains suspended between 6:04PM and 6:14PM, delays continued until around 8:00PM

Details: A fire in the air conditioning unit in the Strathfield signal box caused an evacuation of all staff in it. This signal box controls all lines other than the Eastern Suburbs and Illawarra Lines, which are controlled out of Central, resulting in a brief suspension of services and then delays until late into the evening. Cityrail was criticised for not having redundancy plans in place to run signalling operations from Central as a back up option.

3. St Leonards

Cause: Mechanical repairs on broken down train

Date: 14 February 2013

Lines affected: North Shore and Northern Lines

Duration: Trains suspended between 5:04PM and 5:18PM, delays continued until around 7:30PM

Details: A broken down train in St Leonards at the beginning of the afternoon peak caused delays that continued until the mid evening.  This also coincided with the evening of Valentines Day.

4. Como

Cause: Broken down freight train

Date: 28 February 2013

Lines affected: Eastern Suburbs and Illawarra Lines

Duration: Trains suspended between 5:57AM and 8:42AM, delays continued until 1:10PM

Details: A broken down train causes a suspension of services between Sutherland and Hurstville for the whole of the morning peak. Trains did not return to timetabled operations until the early afternoon. Further disruptions occurred in the afternoon peak on other lines in the network, but did not affect the Eastern Suburbs and Illawarra Lines.

5. Harbour Bridge

Cause: Loose piece of metal on the bridge

Date: 28 February 2013

Lines affected: North Shore Line (Western and Northern Lines delayed by another, unrelated, incident)

Duration: Trains suspended between 6:48PM and 9:51PM

Details: A loose piece of metal was spotted hanging above the train tracks on the Harbour Bridge, resulting in a suspension of services between Wynyard and North Sydney. Services did not resume until the late evening. Unrelated delays on the City Circle spread to the Western and Northern Lines.

6. Wynyard

Cause: Fire

Date: 1 March 2013

Lines affected: North Shore, Western and Northern Lines

Duration: Trains delayed from 1:57PM, then suspended between 2:28PM and 2:40PM, delays continued until 4:33PM

Details: A fire in the train tunnel at Wynyard suspended trains in the mid afternoon between Wynyard and North Sydney  Trains returned to timetabled service by the afternoon peak.

Transport Sydney reaches 150 posts

This is post number 150 for this blog, which has now been running for almost 2 years since it began in August of 2011, the month after the author of this blog visited every station in the Cityrail suburban network in one 24 hour period using only the rail network to get around (video below).

In recent months, a typical week will see this blog get 1 or 2 new posts, receive about 1,000 hits, representing 500 unique visitors, generating 3 comments, and being shared 3 times on social media. About 100 of those visitors are regular readers (RSS feeds, email subscriptions, etc) or referrals from social media, while the remaining 400 are split fairly evenly between web searches and image searches. Last month, this site passed the 50,000 hits milestone.

It’s worth re-visiting some of the posts which were read and commented on a lot during that time.

Posts with the most views

1. Media fooled by UNSW monorail hoax 31 July 2012 (4,809 views)
2. Point to point vs zonal ticketing 2 September 2011 (2,058 views)
3. Light rail extension update 15 February 2012 (650 views)
4. History of Cityrail: Eastern Suburbs Line (1979) 8 November 2011 (645 views)
5. Are there alternatives to the metro plan? 11 October 2011 (601 views)

The most viewed post was one which was not really covered by the TV, radio, or online media, other than ones falling for the initial hoax. The lack of any competing source covering this story led to this particular post going viral, with 85 tweets and 178 shares on Facebook, including by the University of New South Wales, resulting in 3,270 hits on 31 July 2012 alone.

Foundation day prank - media fooled by UNSW monorail hoax http://t.co/vgMCZa00

— UNSW (@UNSW) July 31, 2012

The second most viewed post, written in the first few weeks after this blog was started, is about different ways in which fares can be calculated. It is likely to remain an item of interest as Opal is rolled out and the possibility of integrating fares in Sydney is considered.

Posts with the most comments

1. Should the Northwest Rail Link be a metro? 8 February 2013 (30 comments)
2. Problems with the M4 East and Strathfield Metro 24 October 2012 (15 comments)
3. Western Sydney makes its case for an airport of its own 15 February 2013 (13 comments)
4. Infrastructure NSW Report (part 3): The ugly 6 October 2012 (13 comments)
5. Infrastructure NSW Report (part 2): The bad 5 October 2012 (10 comments)

It is interesting to note that none of the 5 posts in the first list (most viewed) are repeated in the second list (most commented). As a general rule, people are more likely to comment on a post when they disagree with it, while they share it on social media when they agree with it (leading to more views). That probably explains the difference in each list.

The posts about the Northwest Rail Link and Sydney Airport in particular were great examples of commenters who disagreed with the contents of the post. Both the articles, along with the comments and follow-up responses, are a fantastic read for anyone looking to get a more in-depth discussion of those particular issues (but doesn’t who want to dip their feet into the world of online transport discussion forums).

Robertson outlines transport vision

The NSW Government has ignored Western Sydney and the advice of its independent advisory body, Infrastructure NSW, according to Opposition Leader John Robertson in a speech yesterday to the Rail Future Conference. He also accused the government of mismanaging those projects currently underway, pointing to cost blow-outs, choosing projects with a poor cost-benefit ratio, and lacking either a start or end date for construction.

Today I gave a major speech on Labor’s transport priorities to the Sydney Rail Future Conference 2013. To read my... http://t.co/llYnVCJaWx

— John Robertson (@jrobertsonmp) February 28, 2013

Mr Robertson defended the previous Labor Government’s record on transport, admitting that while he is “the first to admit that the previous Labor Government made its share of mistakes” that it also had its fair share of achievements.

“The South West Rail Link – planned and construction commenced under Labor, leaving the incoming Government with little but a ribbon to cut. The creation of rail clearways – a first step towards untangling Sydney’s spaghetti of lines. Rolling stock renewal through the acquisition of 35 Millennium trains, 55 Oscars and 78 Waratahs. The Inner West Light Rail Line. The Epping-Chatswood Rail Link. Dozens of commuter car parks and easy access upgrades. The $100 million state-of-the-art bus interchange at Parramatta railway station. And an innovative new system of Metrobuses.” – John Robertson, Opposition Leader (28 February 2013)

John Robertson, NSW Opposition Leader (Image: NSW Parliament)

Many of these achievements should not be understated. Clearways sought to improve the existing network rather than just add new lines, leading to higher capacity and greater reliability. The new rolling stock listed represents a renewal of about half of Cityrail’s electric trains over a period of about a decade. Metrobuses, which introduced the concept of through-routing and certainty over all day frequency, are a fantastic addition to the Sydney transport system, and one which should be expanded. Mr Robertson failed to mention other improvements, such as the introduction of myZone – which was a (baby) step towards integrated fares, the construction of T-Ways from Parramatta to Rouse Hill and Liverpool – allowing fast and reliable bus services to and from Parramatta, or the Unsworth Review – which brought planning for bus routes under central control but established an effective way for private companies to operate them. All of these are positive, and should be remembered every time Labor’s failures (which were more than its fair share, as Mr Robertson claims) are raised.

Where Mr Robertson’s speech falls short is in providing a positive vision for transport in Sydney, it is instead a critique of the government’s policy, what he doesn’t stand for rather than what he does.

“Taxpayers are forking out $17 million a year on Infrastructure NSW – only for the Government to ignore its advice.” – John Robertson, Opposition Leader (28 February 2013)

His attack on Infrastructure NSW shows a misunderstanding of the purpose of that body. Mr Robertson compares the ignorance of Infrastructure SWN to Infrastructure Australia, who’s advice is used to fund various infrastructure projects around the country. But Infrastructure NSW is not designed to hand out funding, it is designed to attract funding, primarily from the private sector via Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). That is why its board includes members with expertise in PPPs – such as Chairman Nick Greiner or board member Max Moore-Wilton. When it comes to making policy decision on which transport project to fund, the government instead relies on Transport for NSW, as it should.

“We have a Government stubbornly committed to its flagship project, the North West Rail Link. One that has been approved outside the Infrastructure NSW process…that Mr Greiner says has a low cost-benefit ratio and is being built for political reasons.” – John Robertson, Opposition Leader (28 February 2013)

In his introduction, Mr Robertson presents transport in Sydney as a choice between differerring options. One of these options is between the North West Rail Link (NWRL) and the Parramatta to Epping Rail Link (PERL). He then all but endorses the PERL as a preferred option, while attacking the NWRL for its low cost-benefit ratio. Problematic here is that he relies on Mr Greiner’s judgement, someone who would generally prefer private road projects than public rail ones, and so would most likely also attack the PERL for the same reasons. In fact, this is exactly what Infrastructure Australia Chairman Michael Deegan did when he said that “the Parramatta-Epping rail link…is not on Infrastructure Australia’s priority list” (7 May 2012). Criticising a project for being political in nature, only to put forward an alternative that is just as, if not more political, is not convincing from a policy perspective.

“The problem with the O’Farrell Government’s transport priorities is that they’re completely at odds with Western Sydney’s emerging needs…It has ignored Western Sydney’s exponential population growth, its high car dependency and low residential density…And it has provided no new vision for Western Sydney bus routes and transitways.” – John Robertson, Opposition Leader (28 February 2013)

These words presented the best opportunity for Mr Robertson to attack the government and present a viable alternative. It is very true that the current NSW Government has very little in the way of transport improvements for Western Sydney. But instead of using this as the basis for something transformative, Mr Robertson uses it as a soap box to all but call for the construction of the PERL. Yet this falls right into the narrative of an expensive project that sucks out the capital works budget for the entire region, the very criticism aimed at the government on the NWRL, Second Harbour Crossing, WestConnex, and South East Light Rail. Not only would this project be expensive, but it fails to fit into the dispersed and low density urban form that he himself speaks of.

Frequency transport map for Sydney. The left shows all areas within 400m of public transport, while the right shows the same but only for services with 15 minute frequencies. Click on image for higher resolution. (Source: Sydney Alliance.)

But his words on a new vision on buses is where he really drops the ball. Here he could have easily have made a commitment to raise bus frequencies to 15 minutes or better all day all across Western Sydney. It would help to solve the problem he had just described: “the Sydney Alliance produced maps showing which parts of Sydney are within 400 metres walking distance of public transport…where a service comes at least every 15 minutes across the day…as soon as you start going west from Strathfield, the map looks pretty bleak”. But instead he opted to talk about the PERL, without ever actually committing to it.

This month will be the mid point between the 2011 election and 2015 election. In that time the NSW Labor Party has barely closed the gap in the polls. Mr Robertson’s speech contained some positive vision, but it was drowned out by the negativity. That is not to say that the opposition should not hold the government to account, but if it then fails to present its own vision, an alternative, then it is likely to stay in opposition for quite some time.

Pointing out Labor’s past achievements are a good start. Now how about telling us what you will do in the future, Mr Robertson?